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NOTES
HUMOR, DEFAMATION AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: THE POTENTIAL
PREDICAMENT FOR PRIVATE FIGURE PLAINTIFFS
INTRODUCTION
Since President Reagan appointed Mark Fowler' chairman of
the Federal Communications Commission in 1981, the Commission
has significantly reduced government regulation of the electronic
media.2 One consequence of deregulation is the proliferation of so-
called "shock jocks," radio personalities hired for their comedic
skills who often cross traditional boundaries of media decorum in
the contest for shares of the radio audience.3 For example, radio
personality Howard Stern telephoned Air Florida after one of its
planes crashed into the Potomac River to ask about the price of a
one-way ticket from National Airport to the 14th Street Bridge.4
1. Commissioner Fowler resigned his position in 1987 to enter the private practice of com-
munications law. Over the course of Fowler's tenure as chairman, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) relaxed its rules governing the content of radio and television pro-
gramming and ownership of media properties, and significantly reduced the amount of
paperwork involved in the administration of the FCC and in managing radio and television
stations. Mr. Fowler also supported the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, a long-standing
FCC rule requiring station owners to communicate opposing sides of significant public is-
sues. A Chairman Who Marched to His Own Drummer, BROADCASTING, Mar. 23, 1987, at 51.
2. See S. BECKER, DISCOVERING MASS COMMUNICATION 284, 289, 319, 470 (1983); S. HEAD &
C. STERLING, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 460-61 (1982); see also In re Deregulation of Radio,
73 F.C.C.2d 457, 481, 492, 538-39 (1979) (outlining proposed rule-making to deregulate com-
mercial broadcast radio).
3. For discussions of shock jock programming, see Barol, The Grossest Guys on the Air-
waves, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1986, at 80; Carpenter, Cleansing the Airwaves, PROGRESSIVE,
Jan. 1986, at 17-18; Reed, Raunch 'n' Roll Radio is Here to Stay, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
May 4, 1987, at 52; Stengel, Radio Daze, TIME, Apr. 27, 1987, at 32.
4. Barol, supra note 3, at 80. Stern, who has been offending radio listeners and simultane-
ously earning high ratings for years, currently broadcasts a show from New York that is
simulcast in Philadelphia. Stern's previous employer fired him after a dispute in which
Stern called his employers "scumbags" on the air. Stern's current show features tasteless
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In another example, a top-rated radio show in Tampa featured a
pair of disc jockeys who played a song entitled "Electric Avenue"
every time a condemned person died in the Florida electric chair.'
With the advent of this type of program, which encourages a com-
bination of confrontation, harassment, humiliation and sensation-
alism, 6 the number of lawsuits against radio stations for defama-
tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress has increased
markedly.7
Individuals who have been the target of some of the more ex-
treme examples of such jokes understandably want compensation.
As Jerry Falwell learned recently, however, recovery against media
defendants does not come easily.8 Media defendants routinely
claim that the first amendment protects their actions.9 Courts have
traditionally permitted media defendants substantial leeway in sit-
uations involving satire, parody and other forms of humor.10 The
governing case law involves public figures, however, and the theo-
"theme" dial-a-date contests and game shows such as "Guess Who's the Jew?" He also
broadcasts live advertisements for many of his sponsors, during which Stern insults the
sponsors, their families and their products and services. Id.
5. Id. Shock jocks are popular across the country. In November 1986, three shock jocks
were battling for the morning radio ratings in Dallas. Jacksonville and Tampa also have
their own shock jocks. Id.
6. Importantly, most shock jocks apparently do not seek to further any sort of social
agenda with their comments. Howard Stern is representative of most. Stern is an equal
opportunity offender, whose penchant for offending everyone implies that the primary, and
perhaps sole, purpose of his broadcasts is to make people laugh.
Even jokes based on social or political issues often do not easily fit within traditional
constitutionally protected speech. For example, Washington D.C.'s Doug "the Greaseman"
Tracht celebrated the first marking of Dr. Martin Luther King's birthday as a national holi-
day by suggesting that if the assassination of a black leader led to a day off from work, then
killing more blacks would result in more vacation time. Id.
When the first amendment protects this kind of material, it protects primarily the value
of a laugh rather than one of the more traditional ends of the first amendment freedom of
expression, such as searching for truth and aiding the ability of the people to govern them-
selves. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
7. Blodgett, Radio Daze: Targets Strike Back, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1988, at 15 (describing these
kind of actions as "part of a growing trend. Many targets of such practical jokes aren't
laughing.").
8. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See generally B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION
AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION § 1.1 (1985) (explaining the changes in libel law and the effects
on media defendants).
10. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 46; Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d
438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1982); Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior
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retical framework recent Supreme Court decisions have con-
structed11 does not afford private figures adequate compensation. 2
Consider the following scenarios: A Louisiana woman received a
telephone call one month prior to her wedding from a man who
identified himself as the caterer of her reception. The caller re-
ferred to her fiance as a "dork" and told her that she had to
change the wedding date because someone else had booked the re-
ception hall. The caller was actually a disc jockey who taped the
call and later broadcast it as a prank. As a result, the bride-to-be
suffered hysterical seizures and required substantial psychiatric
care.' A Florida attorney wrote to a local radio station and com-
plained of the offensive nature of a portion of the station's pro-
gramming. One of the radio personalities at the station broadcast
the attorney's address and phone number and encouraged the sta-
tion's listeners to harass the attorney. Over a period of several
months, the same radio host allegedly mentioned the attorney by
name more than 40,000 times and in this manner was responsible
for much of the abuse the attorney received from the station's lis-
teners over the same period. 4 These types of cases currently fall
into an analytical black hole. No clear rules governing recovery for
private figure plaintiffs against media defendants exist.
This Note explains traditional remedies that plaintiffs seek
against media defendants. It also analyzes recent court decisions in
an effort to predict a trend for resolving actions for defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress that private figure
plaintiffs bring against media defendants who have published ma-
terial intended to be humorous. The Note concludes by proposing
Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985); Frank v. National Broadcasting Co.,
119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1986).
11. For a summary of the Supreme Court's defamation decisions, see Smolla, Dun &
Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of
Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1571-73 (1987). Professor Smolla has set out in tabular form
the effects of various combinations of important variables, including identity of the plaintiff,
identity of the defendant, status of the speech, level of fault, types of damages and voting
behavior of the Supreme Court Justices.
12. Private figure plaintiffs do not voluntarily inject themselves into a public controversy,
and often do not have access to the media to combat the harmful speech of the defendants.
See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
13. Blodgett, supra note 7, at 15.
14. Blodgett, Say 'Jack' 40,000 Times, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1988, at 17.
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an analytical method by which courts can hold liable media de-
fendants who, in the name of humor, egregiously harass, humiliate
or falsely portray private figure plaintiffs.
TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
Federal Communications Commission Regulations
Because the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regu-
lates the broadcast media, it offers some, though very limited, re-
dress for harmful humor. The restrictions placed on the broadcast
media have traditionally been greater than those placed on other
media. One justification for this is the idea that with the creation
of the FCC, Congress "condemned" the airwaves.15 "Because of the
scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be ex-
pressed on this unique medium." ' The FCC must undertake cer-
tain duties "as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quires. '1 7 Although the FCC may not censor broadcasts," it can
revoke or suspend a radio or television station's license for a vari-
ety of reasons,' 9 including the broadcast of obscene language. 20 The
FCC also enforces a prohibition against indecent language.2' When
the Commission receives a complaint that does not focus on either
the obscenity or the indecency of a broadcast, however, its respon-
sibilities and powers are considerably less clear.
15. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights in the Modern Administrative-Industrial State,
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321, 333 (1990).
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see M. FRANKLIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FOURTH ESTATE 499 (1981). "The origin of the phrase, 'public interest, convenience and
necessity,'. . . is unclear from legislative documents," Franklin noted. "'The standard was
almost drained of meaning under section 307 of the Communications Act, where the issue
was almost never the need for broadcasting service but rather who should render it.'" Id.
(quoting FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 54-55 (1962)).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 326.
19. Id. § 303(m).
20. Id. § 303(m)(1)(D). (FCC can suspend operator's license upon transmission of "pro-
fane or obscene words, language, or meaning."); id. § 312(a)(6) (FCC can revoke operator's
license for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982), which pertains to broadcasting obscene
language.).
21. 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2726 (1987). "The Commission, by this public notice, puts all broadcast
and amateur radio licensees on notice as to new standards that the Commission will apply in
enforcing the prohibition against obscene and indecent transmissions." Id.
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The FCC has been reluctant to sanction stations on speech
grounds except when the speech is clearly outside the scope of first
amendment protection.2 2 It has yet to attempt to revoke or fail to
renew a station's license because it has received complaints of ra-
dio personalities amusing their listeners at the expense of private
individuals. The FCC demonstrated its aversion to interfering with
radio programming through deregulation, which, in effect, shifted
regulation from the FCC to the marketplace. 23 The relaxation of
regulation helps explain the emergence of shock jocks. Because hu-
mor such as "shock radio" receives high ratings, thus making such
programs popular with sponsors,24 stations have great incentive to
keep such programs on the air. For these reasons, the FCC's regu-
lations are of little use to a private figure plaintiff who has been
the subject of "shock" humor.25
Tort Remedies for Media Attacks
Plaintiffs who suffer humiliating and harassing attacks at the
hands of the media have, in most instances, suffered two distinct
types of harm. One type of harm is the damage done to the plain-
tiff's reputation, and the other is the damage done to the plaintiff's
physical and mental well-being. Although elements of the two inju-
ries overlap, separate torts have evolved to compensate plaintiffs
for each kind of injury. The common law of defamation protects a
plaintiff's reputational interest,26 and the comparatively new tort
22. See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THa FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH
ESTATE. REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 104 (1986).
23. In 1981, the FCC adopted proposals that reduced the regulations affecting commercial
radio licensees. In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 968-69 (1981).
24. Barol, supra note 3, at 80. "Both Stern and Tracht get away with what they do be-
cause of commercial clout. Stern took the WXRK morning show from a 1.2 share to a 6.2 in
his first six months. Advertisers tend to put delicate questions of taste aside when con-
fronted with numbers like these." Id. In Stem's case, the advertisers even put up with in-
sults to themselves and their businesses. Id.
25. For example, the Personal Attack Rule provides that when an attack is made upon
the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group
during the presentation of views on a controversial issue, the person or group must be noti-
fied, sent a script or tape, and given a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's
facilities. However, this Rule is of little help to a private figure plaintiff who has been
harmed because the element of a "controversial issue" is likely to be missing. 47 C.F.R. §
73.679 (1974).
26. B. SANFORD, supra note 9, § 4.3.
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of intentional infliction of emotional distress protects the plaintiff
from the statement's physical and emotional impact on the
plaintiff.17
The Elements of Defamation
The common law tort of libel protects an individual's interest in
his reputation. If a statement "injures the subject's reputation by
lowering the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which he is
viewed, 2 s that individual has suffered the requisite harm entitling
him to bring a libel action against the statement's publisher.
According to section 558 of the Second Restatement of Torts, a
plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case for libel when he shows (1) a
false and defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff, (2)
communicated to at least one other person, (3) with fault amount-
ing to at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (4)
either actionability without any special harm or the existence of
special harm."' In addition to establishing these elements of defa-
mation, plaintiffs must also maneuver past constitutional protec-
tions that the United States Supreme Court has provided for me-
dia defendants. In the landmark case New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,"0 the Supreme Court held that the first amendment re-
quired plaintiffs who are public officials seeking damages show that
the defendant published the allegedly defamatory material with
"actual malice"-either knowledge that the material was false or
27. Id. § 11.3.4.
28. Id. § 4.22 (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at
773 (5th ed. 1984); see Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E.
217, 218 (1933) (citing Sydney v. Macfadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 211-12,
151 N.E. 209, 210 (1926)) (defining libel as publications that expose the plaintiff to "public
hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degrada-
tion or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons,
and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society").
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times decision has generated an enormous
amount of academic comment. See, e.g., Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection
of Reputation and Privacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How it Grew, 56 Ky. L.J.
718 (1968); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Merin, Libel and
the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1969); Pierce, The Anatomy of an His-
toric Decision, New York Times v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1965).
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with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the material.31 In
subsequent cases, the Court expanded the scope of this first
amendment protection to cover all public figure plaintiffs3 and, al-
though later overruled, to all issues of public concern."
31. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. Two years later, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75 (1966), the Court issued the first in a series of decisions that, taken cumulatively, ex-
panded the scope of the New York Times holding from "public officials" to "public figures."
In Rosenblatt, the county commissioner of Belknap, New Hampshire, appointed the plain-
tiff to supervise a public recreation center. The defendant, a newspaper columnist, sharply
criticized the manner in which the center was operated. The plaintiff prevailed in state
court, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and instructed the trial court to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff was a public official for first amendment purposes. Id. at 85-88.
After noting that the central purpose of providing protection to speakers was to offer citi-
zens the opportunity to criticize their government, the Court declared that "the 'public'
official designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or con-
trol over the conduct of governmental affairs." Id. at 85.
32. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion). In Butts, the defendant publisher suggested in a Satur-
day Evening Post story that the plaintiff, the football coach at the University of Georgia,
attempted to fix a football game. In Walker, the Associated Press published a story that
accused the plaintiff, a retired United States Army general, of leading an attack on federal
marshals at the University of Mississippi while the marshals were supervising the enroll-
ment of the university's first black student. Both plaintiffs were successful in the lower
courts, which had declined to apply the New York Times test.
The Supreme Court applied the New York Times test in both cases, concluding that
"public figures" as well as "public officials" came within the scope of that decision because
the "differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and adoption of separate
standards of proof for each has no basis in law, logic or First Amendment policy." Id. at 163
(Warren, J., concurring). Although the Court regarded both plaintiffs as "public figures," it
affirmed Butts by a 5-4 vote on the facts, and unanimously reversed Walker. See Kalven,
The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. RaV.
267.
33. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion). In Rosen-
bloom, defendant Metromedia accused Rosenbloom, a private figure, of selling obscene ma-
terial. The Supreme Court used this case to slide further down the slippery slope of ex-
panding first amendment protection by holding that the New York Times actual malice
standard applied to all cases involving matters of public or general interest even ifa private
figure plaintiff was harmed. Id. at 44-45.
The Court's extension of New York Times to suits involving private figure plaintiffs and
matters of public concern in Rosenbloom was overruled in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974):
[W]e conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts
to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation
of a private individual. The extension of the New York Times test proposed by
the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a de-
gree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty
of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publica-
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For private figures, the standard is less rigorous. In Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 4 the Supreme Court held that private figure
plaintiffs need only show negligence in order to recover in a defa-
mation action.3 5 The Court's rationale for permitting a lesser show-
ing by private figure plaintiffs was that public figures "usually en-
joy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally
enjoy. '36
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court set forth in Gertz
a constitutional privilege for speakers to express opinions without
fear of liability. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
"[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its cor-
rection not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the com-
petition of other ideas. '37 Although the Court rendered the Gertz
decision in a defamation context, the principle applies logically to
any tort action that might subject a defendant to liability solely
because the defendant has expressed an opinion.
Shortly after the Court's decision in Gertz, the Second Restate-
ment of Torts was revised to include a section specifically address-
ing expressions of opinion: "A defamatory communication may
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of
this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undis-
closed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion."3 " Thus, a me-
tions address issues of "general or public interest" and which do not-to deter-
mine . . "what information is relevant to self-government."
Id. at 345-46 (citation omitted).
34. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
35. The private figure plaintiff may recover only for compensatory damages. He or she
cannot recover punitive damages because Gertz allows compensation only for actual injuries.
Id. at 349-50.
36. Id. at 344. The Court also suggested that public figures were largely responsible for
their position in public discourse because they had "thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."
Id. at 345.
37. Id. at 339-40.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). Bruce Sanford suggests four rules for
potential liability of expressions of opinion:
1. A statement of opinion, no matter how derogatory, is not actionable if the
underlying facts are stated. However, a cause of action based on the underlying
facts may be available if the underlying facts are themselves defamatory.
[Vol. 31:701
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dia defendant cannot be liable for publishing pure opinions, and
any defendant who publishes even admittedly defamatory state-
ments will incur no liability without at least some showing of fault.
The Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Apart from an injury the media may inflict upon a plaintiff's
reputation, a plaintiff can recover for severe harm to his psyche
under the emerging tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.3 9 Section 46 of the Second Restatement of Torts explains
intentional infliction of emotional distress as follows: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it,
for such bodily harm. ' 40 Consequently, a successful plaintiff must
show (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) that is extreme and
outrageous, (3) that actually causes severe emotional distress, and
(4) that the defendant proximately caused such distress. According
to the Supreme Court, "[T]he law does not regard the intent to
inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solici-
tude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdic-
tions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in
question is sufficiently 'outrageous.'
Actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress arise in a
variety of factual contexts, and the tort can be an effective tool for
controlling socially undesirable behavior.42 The plaintiff may in-
clude claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a
2. If the facts are stated and not defamatory, there is no liability for the
opinion unless the opinion "reasonably indicate[s] an assertion of the existence
of other defamatory facts that would justify the forming of the opinion."
3. There is no liability for the expression of an opinion based on unstated
facts if the facts are assumed by the parties to the communication. Again, the
implication that other defamatory facts exist defeats the immunity.
4. Liability arises for the expression of a derogatory opinion if the facts are
not stated and if the opinion can reasonably be taken to imply the existence of
defamatory facts.
B. SANFORD, supra note 9, § 5.4.1.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
40. Id.
41. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
42. Note, Falwell v. Flynt: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Threat to
Free Speech, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 993, 1000 (1987).
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complaint when he or she seeks compensation for severe emotional
distress suffered as a result of the defendant's publication, espe-
cially in those instances in which constitutional law appears to
foreclose a defamation action.
THE CASES
Courts and commentators have pronounced modern defamation
law to be a chaotic and confused body of concepts and cases.4 Re-
cently, a substantial amount of scholarship has included the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress in discussions of defa-
mation law and policy."4 The recent landmark case Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell45 helped settle some of the confusion involving the
43. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 11, at 1519-24. Professor Smolla suggests that in the
wake of the Supreme Court's efforts to define the constitutional limits of defamation
actions,
it has become increasingly difficult to discern exactly what the states are free
to do with the torts of slander and libel. The Court has deconstitutionalized
and returned to the common law some aspects of defamation, and has constitu-
tionalized and withdrawn from the common law other aspects. In each case,
however, the Court has left unclear how much it has given and how much it
has taken away. At a time in which the law of defamation is so deeply dissatis-
fying to plaintiffs and to defendants, and calls for reform are gaining increasing
support, this doctrinal uncertainty is especially damaging, for it so clouds the
picture that intelligent judgments about the future course of defamation be-
come almost impossible to make.
Id. at 1523 (footnotes omitted); see also Smolla & Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform
Proposal: The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 25, 25 (1989) ("For 200 years,
the common law of libel operated under a complex and bizarre set of rules .... "); Wissler,
Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, Why Current Libel Law Doesn't Work, 27 JUDGES J. 28
(1988) (discussing problems with current libel law and the advantages of certain out-of-
court alternatives for resolving libel suits).
44. For commentary on the interaction of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation, see Boatwright, Constitutional Law: Free Speech and Emotional Distress, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 843 (1988); Drechsel, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
New Tort Problems for the Mass Media, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 889 (1985); Smolla, Emo-
tional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 423 (1988); Comment, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: The Application of the Actual Mal-
ice Standard to Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 825
(1988); Note, Free Speech and Freedom from Speech: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, The
New York Times Actual Malice Standard and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
63 IND. L.J. 877 (1988); Note, supra note 42; Note, Did Falwell Hustle Hustler? Allowing
Public Figures to Recover Emotional Distress Damages for Nonlibellous Satire, 44 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1381 (1987).
45. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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interaction of the two torts. As the leading case in this area, the
Hustler Magazine decision also illuminates several basic ideas in-
volving constitutional protection for humorous material.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: The Collision of Constitutional Law
and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Hustler Magazine, the Reverend Jerry Falwel 48 sued Hustler
magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, for libel, invasion of pri-
vacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The action
arose from Hustler's publication of a parody portraying Falwell as
a habitual drunkard who had engaged in an incestuous relationship
with his mother.47 The trial judge dismissed the claim for invasion
of privacy.48 The jury found for the defendants on the libel claim,
concluding that the parody was not defamatory. 49 Falwell suc-
ceeded, however, on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, receiving an award of $200,000.50
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,51 noting
that to succeed on his libel claim Falwell must meet the New York
Times actual malice standard.52 The court upheld the intentional
infliction of emotional distress award, stating that "when the first
amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the
standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's inten-
46. Jerry Falwell is a well known television evangelist and conservative political figure.
See infra note 73.
47. See R. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL
(1988) for a complete account of the case. The publication at issue in Hustler Magazine was
a one page "ad parody" satirizing both Falwell and the Campari Liqueur advertisements in
which various celebrities spoke of their "first times." Id. at 21-22. Hustler took advantage of
the ad campaign's double entendre and produced its own crude parody, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist labeled "a distant cousin" of the American tradition of political cartoons, "and a
rather poor relation at that." Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 55.
48. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
49. Id. The jury found that a reasonable person would not think that the Hustler parody
suggested actual facts about Falwell. Id. at 49. The jury's verdict is consistent with the
"short, working definition of libel for today's journalist [which] is 'a false statement of fact
printed or broadcast about a person which tends to injure that person's reputation.'" B.
SANFORD, supra note 9, § 4.2 (footnote omitted).
50. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 49. Falwell's award consisted of $100,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $50,000 each from co-defendants Hustler magazine and Larry Flynt. Id.
51. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
52. Id. at 1274.
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tional or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury
complained of."53
The Supreme Court reversed,54 also invoking the New York
Times actual malice standard. The Court ruled that in this in-
stance Falwell could not recover unless he could show that "the
publication contain[ed] a false statement of fact which was made
with 'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true." 55
Commentators have argued that the Court improperly applied the
New York Times test in this context.5 " Under their view, the New
York Times test is relevant only in situations involving questions
of fact. In Hustler Magazine, no such question presented itself.
The ad parody was facially untrue in any literal sense, and the de-
fendant did not allege its truthfulness, so further inquiry was un-
necessary. Even if the Court correctly applied the New York Times
test to these "facts," at least on a technical level, they satisfied the
elements of New York Times actual malice because the defendant
made the publication intentionally "with knowledge that the state-
ment was false. '57 If, on the other hand, the Court considered the
parody to express the defendant's opinion, the New York Times
test would not apply because no "false statement of fact"
appeared. 8
53. Id. at 1275. In so ruling, the court refused to apply the New York Times test literally.
New York Times required the plaintiff to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
the truth. When applied to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that
requirement would gdd a new element. Instead, the court reasoned that "[p]roperly read,
New York Times focuses on culpability," on whether the conduct was "'knowing . . . or
reckless.'" Id. Ultimately, the New York Times standard is identical to the "intentional or
reckless" element of Virginia's intentional infliction of emotional distress doctrine. Id.
54. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Fitzgerald, Humor and the Law of Libel: Serious Protections for Attacks Made in
Jest, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 377, 387 (1988); Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York
Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C.L. REV. 273, 274 (1990); Note, Protecting Satire
Against Libel Claims: A New Reading of the First Amendment's Opinion Privilege, 98
YALE L.J. 1215, 1224 (1989).
57. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56.
58. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). This distinction is of crucial
importance. Had the Court analyzed the problem more efficiently, it need not have applied
the New York Times test. According to the jury, the Hustler parody did not communicate
any false statement of fact. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Therefore, a separate
analysis is appropriate. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
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Clearly, the Court in Hustler Magazine reinforced constitutional
protection for satire, parody and other forms of humor. 59 The issue
remains, however, as to when, if ever, a joke may be actionable. At
trial, Falwell established each of the elements necessary to recover
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Nev-
ertheless, the Court denied Falwell's recovery, citing Hustler's first
amendment privilege.
The Court also gave substantial attention to the culpability of
the defendant's conduct, an element necessary to maintain a suc-
cessful action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.60 In
order to recover, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted
"outrageously." '6 ' At the district court level, the jury characterized
the Hustler parody as outrageous and consequently found for
Falwell.6 In its decision, the Supreme Court seemingly agreed with
the Fourth Circuit that the amount of protection the first amend-
ment affords a media defendant does not change when a plaintiff
sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than li-
bel.63 From this proposition, the Court concluded properly that
permitting recovery simply because a jury found a publication
"outrageous" could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 4
The Court's holding is clear: No public figure may recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on publication of
offensive material without showing that the publication contained
a false statement of fact made with New York Times actual mal-
ice.6 5 Determining precisely what entitled Hustler to raise the first
59. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 53-55; see infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
60. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52-56.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977). The test for outrageousness
is whether an average member of the community, after hearing of the alleged conduct of the
defendant, would exclaim, "Outrageous!" Id.
62. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
63. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 49. The Fourth Circuit noted that "petitioners are
'entitled to the same level of first amendment protection in the claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress that they received in [the] claim for libel.'" Id. (quoting Falwell,
797 F.2d at 1274).
64. Id. at 55. This idea flows from the very roots of first amendment theory. Outrageous
statements are considered outrageous in many instances because they conflict in a funda-
mental manner with the sentiments of the majority. Unconventional ideas of this sort are
clear candidates for first amendment protection. See infra note 122.
65. Id. at 56.
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amendment as a defense requires close analysis of the Court's rea-
soning. First, the Court was plainly unconcerned with the speaker's
motives. At trial Flynt stated that his purpose in publishing the
parody was to "assassinate" Falwell's character.6 6 That Flynt's ma-
licious intent did not affect the Court's opinion is clear from Chief
Justice Rehnquist's statement, "[A] bad motive may be deemed
controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law,
[but] we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the
area of public debate about public figures. '6 7 The Court did not
discuss whether a speaker's intent may be relevant in cases involv-
ing private figure plaintiffs.
Second, the Court discussed the classification of the parody as
fact or opinion in only an oblique fashion. The Court could have
characterized Hustler's parody as merely the speaker's opinion. 8
Because the Court had previously provided constitutional protec-
tion for statements of opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,6e and
several subsequent decisions, 0 the Court could have decided the
case solely on this ground. The jury in Hustler Magazine found
specifically that no reasonable person could have understood the
parody to be a statement of fact. The Court could have accepted
this finding and held that all nonfactual statements-statements
66. In this case, little doubt existed as to the intentional nature of the defendant's ac-
tions, as evidenced by his deposition concerning the parody:
Q: Did you want to upset Reverend Falwell?
A: Yes ....
Q: And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy [Falwell's] integrity, or harm
it, if you could?
A: To assassinate it.
Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273.
67. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 43; see Note, supra note 43, at 887-90 (noting that in
New York Times the Court indicated a concern with protecting "good-faith" critics).
68. The better analysis begins with identifying the allegedly defamatory publication as
either fact or opinion.
69. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
70. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)(protecting defend-
ant's use of the words "scab" and "traitor" in the course of a labor dispute); Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (protecting defendants' use of the word
"blackmail" in the course of a zoning debate because the term could not be reasonably
understood to be a criminal accusation); see also Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 81 (1981) (discussing
the application of the fact/opinion distinction in defamation law and its relationship to the
fair comment privilege).
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not alleging a fact-are necessarily statements of opinion and, as
such, are not actionable.71 Nevertheless, the Court missed an op-
portunity to simplify analysis of this type of problem by neglecting
the distinction between fact and opinion.72
Finally, the Court left open the question of what a private figure
plaintiff must show in order to recover damages for emotional dis-
tress. The Court, as well as the parties to the case, considered it
"clear" that Falwell was a public figure for first amendment pur-
poses.73 The Court's specific notation that Falwell was a public fig-
ure suggests that the New York Times high standard of proof ap-
plicable to public figures in intentional infliction of emotional
distress actions may not be appropriate for private figure plaintiffs.
By inference, private figures will have to prove that the defendent
negligently published a false statement of fact in order to recover.
Courts and commentators that have considered defamation suits
have regarded each of these variables as relevant in formulating a
theory of liability.74 In Hustler Magazine, perhaps unnecessarily,
71. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273.
72. At least one court has used the distinction between fact and opinion to deny recovery
to a plaintiff without having to determine whether or not she was a "public figure [] for a
limited range of issues." Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)). In Deupree, the plaintiff, a sex education teacher,
complained about a statement that she was "much more interested in the titillating sorts of
information [and] . . . actually denies a very secret sort of sexual gratification." Id. at 302.
The Eighth Circuit found this statement to be pure opinion and therefore not actionable
regardless of whether the plaintiff was a private or public figure. Id. at 304-05. This result
suggests that courts can overcome the public/private figure distinction that can be read into
Hustler Magazine by finding that the statement is "pure opinion" and thus protected.
73. 485 U.S. at 57 n.5. Falwell, a fundamentalist Baptist televangelist based in Lynch-
burg, Virginia, founded the Moral Majority, which now operates under the new name of the
Liberty Federation. This group is composed largely of politically conservative individuals
with close ties to Protestant churches and is dedicated to furthering the conservative politi-
cal agenda. The Federation has been associated with the right-to-life movement and efforts
to reintroduce prayer into public schools.
More than 350 television stations carry Falwell's weekly program, Old Time Gospel Hour,
and he appears almost every day on the Liberty Broadcasting Network, a cable and broad-
cast television program channel. Falwell is also a frequent guest on network television news
shows such as CNN's Crossfire, ABC's Nightline, and CBS's Face the Nation.
Finally, Falwell founded Liberty University, a religious college with an enrollment of more
than 7,500 students. Ostling, TV's Unholy Row, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, at 60.
74. See, e.g., B. SANFORD, supra note 9; Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond. An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV.
1349 (1975); Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455; Smolla, supra note 11.
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the Court transplanted much of the modern theory of defamation
to intentional infliction of emotional distress. 5 For defendants, the
same right is at stake when a plaintiff alleges defamation or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress: the right to freedom of ex-
pression. For plaintiffs, at least theoretically, the torts compensate
for two separate harms. Plaintiffs who recover for defamation re-
ceive compensation for damage to their reputations7 6 and plain-
tiffs who recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress re-
ceive compensation for a discernible psychological and, in most
cases, physical harm.7"
Because separate policy considerations support each cause of ac-
tion, at first glance separate tests seem essential to fairly adjudi-
cate the claims. Since deciding New York Times in 1964, the Su-
preme Court has struggled to set forth tests that properly
safeguard the right to freedom of expression while still respecting
an individual's interest in being free from unwarranted personal
attacks. In formulating its scheme, the Court has declared that a
central element in any defamation action is the identity of the
plaintiff.7 s If the plaintiff is a public figure, he is entitled to signifi-
cantly less protection from the media than if he is a private fig-
ure. 79 Although this sort of treatment provides little incentive for
citizens to enter public life, a fair balance is struck between the
robust discussion of public affairs, which the first amendment
plainly anticipates, and the right of citizens to be free from unfair
attacks by the media. 0
Perhaps in response to the constitutional barriers that the Su-
preme Court has constructed, barriers which often deny recovery
75. This kind of "transplant" analysis leads to analytical confusion as to precisely what
issue a court is resolving. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
76. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); see supra text accompanying note 29.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 39-
40. Comment k of § 46 suggests that although a showing of physical harm is not necessary to
maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in those cases involving a
tenuous assertion of severe emotional distress, evidence of physical harm will assist the
plaintiff's efforts in proving the validity of his claim.
78. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 & n.23, 288-92 (1964); see B. SAN-
FORD, supra note 9, § 7.1 (plaintiff's status as public or private person is important factor in
defamation liability).
79. B. SANFORD, supra note 9, § 7.2; see supra notes 31-33; see also Note, supra note 43,
at 1396-97.
80. See B. SANFORD, supra note 9, § 7.2.
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in defamation actions, plaintiffs are increasingly including allega-
tions of intentional infliction of emotional distress in their com-
plaints."' As noted above, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress actions seemingly warrant a slightly different analysis.8 2
Instead of alleging the defendant proximately caused damage to
their reputations, plaintiffs must prove the defendant intentionally
caused severe emotional distress by acting in an outrageous fash-
ion. In Hustler Magazine, the Court weighed the competing inter-
ests-constitutional concerns and individual rights-and devised
implicitly what one might call the "outrageous opinion" defense.
Such a conception of the boundaries of first amendment protection
seems particularly relevant to analysis of humorous expression be-
cause of its generally "outrageous" character. Several pre-Hustler
Magazine cases specifically considered the level of first amend-
ment protection to which humorous expression is entitled.83 These
cases reveal the difficulty courts have encountered in their at-
tempts to establish general principles to guide their decisions.
Polygram Records v. Superior Court: When is a Joke Actionable?
Polygram Records v. Superior Court8 4 involved a nightclub per-
formance by comedian Robin Williams, who included the following
material in his routine: "There are White wines, there are Red
wines, but why are there no Black wines like: REGE, a
81. See R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 24-25 (1986).
82. See B. SANFORD, supra note 9, § 11.3.4.
83. See infra notes 84-111, 123-32 and accompanying text; see also Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 59 (1989) (denying recovery
under both a defamation and a false light theory to an anti-pornography activist whom
Hustler depicted in a cartoon because a reasonable person could not interpret the cartoon as
conveying a statement of fact); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463, 465 (D.N.H. 1987) (de-
nying tort recovery to a plaintiff whom a magazine article described as "a fat version of
Dustin Hoffman's 'Ratso' in Midnight Cowboy" because the statement was an expression of
opinion); Raye v. Letterman, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2047 (1987) (comedian David Letter-
man's statement that "I saw the most terrifying commercial on television last night, featur-
ing Martha Raye, actress, condom user" could not have reasonably communicated facts con-
cerning the plaintiff, who was commonly known as principle spokesperson for a
manufacturer of dentures in which she is referred to as "Martha Raye, actress, denture
wearer"); Franklin v. Friedman, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1146 (1985) (denying libel recov-
ery to plaintiff talk show host whom a comic strip portrayed as shrinking physically because
the cartoon could not reasonably have conveyed a statement of fact).
84. 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985).
1990]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:701
MOTHERFUCKER. It goes with fish, meat, any damn thing it
wants to. I like my wine like I like my women, ready to pass out. '85
A black winemaker, David Rege (pronounced "Reggie") sued Wil-
liams after the routine appeared on a comedy album and in a
Home Box Office comedy program. 6 Rege's defamation suit
claimed that Williams had damaged his reputation and adversely
affected the sale of his wine." All of the parties involved agreed
that "the central question in this case is whether Williams' joke is
as a matter of law actionable as defamation."88 The defendant
maintained that "comedy is a form of expression that is categori-
cally protected by the First Amendment."89 Williams asserted two
competing theories to support this proposition. The first was that
all forms of humor are also forms of social commentary and, in
that sense, are "comparable in certain respects to political speech
and religious expression."9 ° The second theory, which the Calfornia
Court of Appeals ultimately rejected, was that "comedy is, virtu-
ally by definition, not taken seriously or literally."9'
The court pointed out that Williams' two propositions were in-
herently contradictory.92 It reasoned that comedy constitutes a
85. Id. at 546-47, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
86. Id. at 546, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
87. Id. at 546-47, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54. The California Court of Appeal dismissed the
trade libel claim, holding that even if Williams' statements suggested that Rege's goods were
of inferior quality, they were not defamatory because it did not accuse Rege of "dishonesty,
lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic."
Id. at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 256. The court noted that Rege's defamation claim rested in
part on the contention that Williams' monologue associated Rege's wines with blacks, which
Rege claims are "a socio-economic group of persons commonly considered to be the antithe-
sis of wine connoisseurs." Id. at 557, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261. The court said that even if
Williams did convey these meanings, Rege could not recover on a claim that his wine had
been "disparaged by association with a particular racial or ethnic group." Id. The court
found this contention "repugnant to values embedded in our Constitution." Id. at 558, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 262.
88. Id. at 547, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
89. Id. at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
90. Id.
91. Id., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58.
92. Id. at 552-53, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258. "[T]he suggestion that humor cannot serve seri-
ous aims or, as one court put it, 'sharpen the cutting edge of truth' is not easy to reconcile
with petitioners' concomitant assertion, which we find easier to accept, that humor is an
important form of social commentary." Id. (quoting Salomone v. MacMillan Pub. Co., 97
Misc. 2d 346, 349, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)).
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form of social commentary only if it is in fact taken seriously."
The court also believed that the idea that comedy is entitled to
absolute first amendment protection was problematic because com-
edy is difficult, if not impossible, to define.9 4 Drawing a lesson from
the Supreme Court's less than successful efforts to define obscen-
ity,95 the court concluded that "judicial efforts to define a concept
similarly resistant to explication . . . have confused rather than
clarified the jurisprudence of the First Amendment." '96 A proper
inquiry in cases of this type, the court decided, was not whether a
court should categorize the statement as humor, but whether one
could understand the statement in a defamatory sense. The court
concluded that the joke was not defamatory as a matter of law be-
cause the routine was clearly the product of "a comic imagination
impossible for any sensible person to take seriously."9' 8 Despite
Polygram's argument that the monologue was not defamatory be-
cause it was an obvious joke that Williams did not intend for his
audience to take seriously, the court held that the threshold in-
quiry was whether those who heard the statements could reasona-
bly understand them in a defamatory sense.99
93. Id. at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
94. Id., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258. For two attempts to define comedy, see A. COOK, THE DARK
VOYAGE AND THE GOLDEN MEAN: A PHILOSOPHY OF COMEDY (1948) and D. GROTE, THE END OF
COMEDY: THE SIT-COM AND THE COMEDIC TRADITION (1983).
95. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258. The court offered Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), as a case in which the Supreme Court
struggled fruitlessly for an adequate definition of obscenity. Id. at 704 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (defining obscenity as
material that, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (clarifying the key issues in identifying obscene material to be "(a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value") (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
For a complete discussion of the difficulties involved in formulating a proper definition of
obscenity, see Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity". An Exercise in
the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
96. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
97. Id. at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
98. Id. at 556-57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (footnote omitted).
99. See supra note 97.
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The court in Polygram refused, however, to suggest that mate-
rial is constitutionally protected simply because it is a form of hu-
mor. 00 The court noted that "caricature, satire or other forms of
humor which ridicule may in certain circumstances convey a de-
famatory meaning and be actionable even if the words used could
not be understood in their literal sense or believed to be true."' 0'1
Nevertheless, by denying recovery for statements that are "impos-
sible for any sensible person to take seriously,"'0 2 the court af-
forded protection for statements it regarded as outlandish.
Polygram raises, but does not answer, the critical question of
whether inherently unbelievable statements can harm a plaintiff's
reputation.
Pring v. Penthouse International: Greater Protection for Outland-
ish Remarks
In Pring v. Penthouse International,03 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit answered that question in the
negative. 10 4 In Pring, Penthouse magazine published a humorous
article about the sexual prowess of Miss Wyoming. 0 5 The article
described Miss Wyoming's unique contribution to the pageant's
talent competition-her ability to levitate a man by engaging in
oral sex with him. 10 6 The reigning Miss Wyoming, Kimerli Pring,
100. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
101. Id. The court's reference to situations in which a court may impose liability is puz-
zling. The language the court used is susceptible to two very different interpretations, and
each has radically different consequences for defamation law. If the court is suggesting that
a nonfactual reference to a plaintiff can be defamatory, it is apparently recognizing a right
to compensation for reputational injury caused by admittedly unbelievable statements. Ex-
actly what the court had in mind when it referred to "certain circumstances" in which liabil-
ity is appropriate is difficult to determine. One possible explanation is liability for "pure
humor," or statements made for no other purpose than their comedic value. See infra text
accompanying note 149.
A second and perhaps more sound interpretation of the court's language is that courts
should impose liability in cases involving implied facts. When a statement communicates no
facts explicitly, it may nevertheless imply a factual meaning. See B. SANFORD, supra note 9,
§ 5.1-.5.
102. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 556-57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
103. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
104. Id. at 443.
105. Id. at 440-41.
106. Id. This case illustrates the enormous difficulties involved in separating types of ex-
pression. The story communicates several messages, but broadly speaking, the story is a
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successfully sued Penthouse for defamation.107 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit had to determine "whether the story must reasona-
bly be understood as describing actual facts or events about plain-
tiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff."108 Just as the Fourth Circuit
had concluded in Hustler Magazine, the court in Pring noted that
the nature of the alleged tort could not affect the level of protec-
tion that the first amendment afforded the defendant.109 The court
declared that "[i]t would serve no useful purpose to treat sepa-
rately the 'false light' cause of action nor the 'outrageous conduct'
doctrine sought to be injected into the trial, as the same First
Amendment considerations must be applied."' 10
The court reversed the jury verdict, applying logic similar to the
court's in Polygram. Because the story "could not be taken liter-
ally," 1 no reasonable person could have taken it to convey a de-
famatory meaning. Therefore, Pring supports the proposition that
the more outrageous or outlandish a statement is, the lower the
probability that the plaintiff will recover.
parody of beauty pageants. See id. The author might have expressed his contempt for pag-
eants in several other ways, including a philosophical essay, a presentation of sociological
data about the contestants of beauty pageants, or a simple declaration that beauty pageants
are silly exhibitions. Each of these methods would have expressed the author's central point
more or less effectively. Instead, the author elected to write a story. Protection of this
choice, not only of what to say but how to say it, finds support in Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971), in which the defendant was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing in
public a jacket that read "Fuck the Draft." The Court reversed the defendant's conviction
on first amendment grounds, concluding that the "emotive" content of speech deserved con-
stitutional protection equal to the cognitive message. Id. at 26. See generally Haiman,
Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153 (1972)
(arguing that some protection of "freedom from speech" already exists under corollary first
amendment rights, but that creating distinct rules for "unwanted speech" is different and
perhaps unwise).
The facts of Pring also set out the different categories of expression that courts select in
analyzing humor-statements of facts, expressions of opinion and "nonsense" or "fantasy."
See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text. A reader of the Pring article who understood
that the publication was "of and concerning" the plaintiff might have several reactions that
affect the plaintiffs reputation. Although any reasonable person would not likely believe
that Miss Wyoming was capable of levitating another, an inference of some allegation re-
garding her sexual capabilities is reasonable upon reading the story.
107. Pring, 695 F.2d at 439.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 442.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 439.
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FIRST AMENDMENT GOALS
Any regulation affecting broadcasts requires consideration of the
first amendment's rule that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . ,,.*""' The poli-
cies behind decisions to extend, withhold or limit first amendment
protection to some types of speech can help define the level of first
amendment protection that courts should afford media defendants
for publishing humorous statements about private individuals. 113
Once that level of protection is determined, the viability of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a limit on such
speech can be better evaluated.
The Supreme Court has offered many reasons for the prohibi-
tions against interfering with speech. In Whitney v. California,1 4
Justice Brandeis said in his concurrence,
[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth .. . . [I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination . . . Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of gov-
erning majorities ... [the framers] amended the Constitution
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 115
Other premises include that freedom of expression leads to self-
fulfillment, that it is an essential tool for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth, and that it allows for individual involvement in
the democratic process." 6
Hustler Magazine v. Falwe l111 supports the idea that free
speech is necessary to encourage political discourse. This particular
premise of the first amendment, however, does not support the
freedom to engage in speech that ridicules private individuals
purely for the entertainment value of the speech. Although Hustler
Magazine denies recovery by public figures in order to protect po-
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. For a discussion of the different levels of protection afforded various types of speech
in the past, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5
(1985).
114. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
115. Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116. T. CARTER, supra note 22, at 14.
117. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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litical discourse, it arguably has no bearing on cases involving pri-
vate individuals.
The Value of Humor
Undeniably, humor makes important contributions to intellec-
tual, cultural and literary life.118 It is an effective tool of the social
commentator and the bread and butter of the stand-up comedian.
In his opinion in Hustler Magazine, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
counted a brief history of the dramatic effects that editorial car-
toonists have had upon American political discourse. 19 Rehnquist
noted that "[d]espite their sometimes caustic nature, from the
early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the
present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played
a prominent role in public and political debate."1 20
In addition to this social commentary function, humor is an im-
mensely popular form of entertainment.2 1 Unlike the general area
of social and political discourse, however, the Court in Hustler
Magazine did not protect humor specifically for its entertainment
value. Although the decision may implicitly protect satire and par-
ody for their value as entertainment, it emphasized a traditional
rationale for free expression: the search for truth through the ven-
tilation of competing ideas.122
118. See generally, A. COOK, supra note 99; P. GRAWE, COMEDY IN SPACE, TIME, AND THE
IMAGINATION (1983).
119. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 54-55.
120. Id.
121. See generally, M. CHARNEY, COMEDY HIGH AND Low: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPE-
RIENCE OF COMEDY (1987). A quick check of the most popular programs in the electronic
media reveals the deep attraction Americans have for comedy. The demand for motion pic-
ture comedies, situation comedies on broadcast television, and shock jock formats in radio
all attest to the popularity of humorous programming.
122. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51. Protecting speech for its value in discovering
truth has been an important part of first amendment philosophy since the early years of the
twentieth century. In 1919, Justice Holmes argued that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see J. MILL, ON
LIBERTY 21 (C. Shields rev. ed. 1956) (1859) (arguing that silencing an opinion "rob[s] the
human race" because the opinion may be correct, or even if the opinion is false, it will reveal
truth more clearly by plainly conflicting with the truth).
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Nonetheless, first amendment rights are not absolute. At stake
in the long line of cases stretching from New York Times to Hus-
tler Magazine are the rights of individuals to preserve their
reputational interest and to be free from intentionally inflicted
emotional distress. At least one court has suggested that injurious
humorous publications should be actionable. In Triggs v. Sun
Printing & Publishing Association,23 the Court of Appeals of New
York held that" 'a person shall not be allowed to murder another's
reputation in jest.' ",124
John Stuart Mill's ideas help in understanding the rationale behind free expression. His
suggestion that opinions may be objectively classified as true or false, except for those opin-
ions that are partially true was rejected, however, by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) ("Under the First Amendment there is no such thing
as a false idea."). Nevertheless, Mill's essay points out the difficulty in classifying expression
as either fact or opinion. Because no speaker is truly objective, all expression results from
the speaker's subjective perceptions of the world around him. Thus, all expression may be
the mere opinion of the speaker.
Numerous cases reveal the substantial confusion that persists in fact/opinion distinctions.
See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (protecting the
defendant's use of the word "blackmail" because "[i]t is simply impossible to believe that a
reader who reached the word 'blackmail' in either article would not have understood exactly
what was meant: it was [the plaintiff's] public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that
were being criticized."); Hoover v. Peerless Publications, 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209-10 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (allowing recovery for defendant's statement that the plaintiff "had some mental
problems" even though a reasonable interpretation was that the defendant had simply ex-
pressed his opinion, because an equally reasonable interpretation was that the plaintiff had
a mental disease); Stripling v. Literary Guild of America, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1958
(1979), aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that if expression is
considered opinion, the plaintiff cannot possibly meet his burden of proving the statement
false); see also Note, The Fact-Opinion Determination in Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
809 (1988).
123. 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904).
124. Id. at 155, 71 N.E. at 743 (quoting Donoghue v. Hayes, [1831] Hayes, Irish Excheq-
uer 265, 266). The court grounded its theory of liability in public policy:
The single purpose of the rule permitting fair and honest criticism is that it
promotes the public good, enables the people to discern right from wrong, en-
courages merit, and firmly condemns and exposes the charlatan and the cheat,
and hence is based upon public policy. The distinction between criticism and
defamation is that criticism deals only with such things as invite public atten-
tion or call for public comment, and does not follow a public man into his
private life, or pry into his domestic concerns. It never attacks the individual,
but only his work. A true critic never indulges in personalities, but confines
himself to the merits of the subject-matter, and never takes advantage of the
occasion to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion of matters of
public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste.
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Similarly, in the recent case of Frank v. National Broadcasting
Co.,12 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court rec-
ognized that "the danger implicit in affording blanket protection to
humor or comedy should be obvious, for surely one's reputation
can be as effectively and thoroughly destroyed with ridicule as by
any false statement of fact."' 26 In Frank, financial planner Maurice
Frank sued the producers of Saturday Night Live, a television
comedy program that had broadcast a sketch involving a tax ad-
viser called "Fast Frank."'12 7 The plaintiff objected to the sketch
because "Fast Frank," who resembled the plaintiff, humorously ad-
vised clients to take several unusual and improper deductions in
preparing their tax returns.' 28 Although the court suggested that a
plaintiff might receive compensation when a defendant's ridicule
destroys his reputation, 29 the court dismissed the complaint be-
cause the material was "so extremely nonsensical and silly" that no
one could have taken it seriously. 30
In determining whether the humorous remarks were defamatory,
the court focused on whether the statements were intended to in-
jure as well as to amuse, and whether they gave the impression of
being true. 13' In Frank, the New York Supreme Court found the
intent of the speaker to be relevant, whereas in Polygram the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals did not. 32
Balancing Free Expression Against the Plaintiff's Interests
In all of these decisions, the courts balanced the defendant's first
amendment rights of free expression and the chilling effect that
damage awards might have on humorists against the plaintiff's in-
terests in his reputation and in being free from intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress. Although courts have tilted the scales in
favor of protecting expression, they have encountered substantial
difficulty in stating the principles upon which they base their deci-
125. 119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1986).
126. Id. at 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
127. Id. at 254-55, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 261-62, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
130. Id. at 261, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
131. Id. at 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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sions.'3 s This much, however, seems clear. Courts will analyze hu-
morous material in terms of three types of expression:
1. False statement of fact (e.g., Jerry Falwell is an alcoholic
who had his first sexual encounter with his mother in an
outhouse.)
2. Opinion (e.g., It is my view that Falwell is an overrated
hypocrite. To communicate this, I will publish a parody of
Falwell and attribute to him the very sort of immorality that he
so vehemently condemns.)
3. Nonsense/fantasy (e.g., Simply to amuse readers, I will pub-
lish a cartoon attributing immoral acts to Falwell.)
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has set forth various levels
of first amendment protection for each of these categories of ex-
pression. 134 The Constitution protects false statements of fact from
liability unless the speaker acts with some measure of fault. 3 5 The
level of fault required for liability depends on the identity of the
plaintiff.13 6 Public figure plaintiffs must establish that the defend-
ant acted with New York Times actual malice.137 Private figure
plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages on a showing of neg-
ligence.' 8 The doctrine announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
protects publications of pure opinion. 39 Likewise, expressions like
those in Pring and Frank that courts classify as "nonsense" or
"fantasy" are protected from defamation suits because, by defini-
tion, no one will believe them to be literally true." °
Two important questions follow from this analysis. The first is
whether the third type of expression, mere "fantasy" or "non-
133. See Fitzgerald, Humor and the Law of Libel: Serious Protections for Attacks Made
in Jest, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 377, 380-93 (1988).
134. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
135. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-48. Public figures must show actual malice, and private figures
must show at least that the defendant acted negligently, although states may set higher
standards if they so choose. Id. at 342-48.
136. Id. at 342-43.
137. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
138. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47. To collect punitive damages, the private figure plaintiff
must show actual malice. Id.
139. Id. at 343.
140. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 440-43 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983); Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., 119 A.D.2d 252, 257-61, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869,
872-75 (1986).
[Vol. 31:701
HUMOR, DEFAMATION AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
sense," is worthy of first amendment protection. If a plaintiff can
show that this sort of material has harmed his reputation, or can
establish the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
following publication, the question arises whether the first amend-
ment should shield the speaker from liability in the name of free
expression. A second, related question is whether the two catego-
ries of "opinion" and "fantasy" are distinguishable.
First Amendment Protection for "Fantastic" Speech
Frequently, statements that fall into the category of "fantasy" or
"nonsense" will be those intended to be humorous. Commentators
and courts have argued that because no reasonable person will be-
lieve what the court has deemed simple "nonsense," such expres-
sion cannot be defamatory."4 The traditional definition of libel,
however, includes any publication that "tends so to harm the repu-
tation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the commu-
nity or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.' 1 42 A third person may not believe a statement, but still think
less of the target of the joke after hearing it. In this way, a state-
ment that is unbelievable may effectively injure a plaintiff's
reputation.
Nevertheless, the rules governing defamation actions require
that a plaintiff bringing a libel action assert that the defendant
made a false statement of fact. 43 If a jury or a judge finds that an
allegedly defamatory publication is inherently unbelievable, the li-
bel action cannot go forward. The speaker's intention is not impor-
tant in this regard.' The relevant analysis involves only what an
objective, reasonable person might believe after encountering the
141. See, e.g., Polygram Records v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr.
252 (1985). But see Note, Constitutional Law-Satire, Defamation, and the Believability
Rule as a Bar to Recovery-Falwell v. Flynt, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1987) (arguing
that application of the believability rule outside of "traditional" debate settings promotes
intentional falsehoods in order to guarantee protection from defamation recoveries).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
143. Id. § 558.
144. In Hustler Magazine, if Larry Flynt had produced a similar parody attacking a pri-
vate figure, the jury no longer has any preconceived perception of the plaintiff and may find
that the parody asserts defamatory facts. However, labeling the parody as "humor" places
the material in a context not lending itself to the communication of facts, and the incredible
nature of the story may lead the jury to the same result of no liability.
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allegedly libelous material. The ramifications of this analysis strike
individual humorists differently. Practitioners of "low com-
edy"-those who depend on visual humor and gross exaggera-
tion-are less likely to lose a defamation suit than comedians who
employ dry wit.145
Applying this reasoning to intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress actions obtains similar results. Because the Supreme Court
required public figures to assert that a false statement of fact was
made in order to maintain an action for emotional distress in Hus-
tler Magazine,146 it has effectively shielded all nonfactual commu-
nication from either defamation or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress actions, at least in cases involving public figure
plaintiffs.
If courts protect all nonfactual statements from defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress liability, some societal
value should accrue as a result. If we assume that all nonfactual
communication is by definition opinion, the value is fairly clear.
Opinions may help citizens discover "truth" and may aid in the
process of self-government.141 In addition, some believe free ex-
145. See B. SANFORD, supra note 9, at 155. Sanford discusses Myers v. Boston Magazine,
380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376 (1980), a case in which the defendant described a local
sportscaster as the "only newscaster in town who is enrolled in a course for remedial speak-
ing." Id. at 338, 403 N.E.2d at 377. On its face, one might reasonably interpret the state-
ment as communicating a fact. Because the statement appeared in an article entitled "Best
& Worst: Sports," however, the court concluded that the context of the remark suggested
instead that it was merely the opinion of the speaker. Id. at 341, 403 N.E.2d at 379.
146. 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
147. For a discussion of "the search for truth" rationale for free expression, see supra
note 116 and accompanying text. The self-government rationale suggests that citizens of a
democratic society can best perform their role in the governmental process when the flow of
debate is unrestricted. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1948).
The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkative-
ness. It does not require, that on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in
the public debate. . . . [Tihe vital point, stated negatively, is that no sugges-
tion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue
rather than another.
Id. at 25-26.
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pression of individual thoughts and ideas leads to greater self-
fulfillment.148
We need not think of language, however, in such dichotomous
terms. Instead of dividing expression sharply between fact and
opinion, courts could place various sorts of expression along a con-
tinuum. At one end of the continuum is technically precise expres-
sion, that expression oriented toward objective description. At the
other end is utterly random expression. Most communication in-
volves expression edging toward the "objective expression" end of
the continuum, primarily because it is most useful in day-to-day
transactions. Perhaps "opinion," or the subjective, nonfactual ex-
pression used to discover truth and aid in self-government, is lo-
cated in the middle of the continuum. Beyond this class of expres-
sion, and edging toward randomness, is "pure humor," or humor
for its own sake. 149 The solitary goal of expression in this category
is sheer entertainment.
148. The self-fulfillment rationale suggests that the value derived from free expression is
the simple autonomy to which it attaches. According to one commentator, free speech is
vital because it offers the
self-respect that comes from a mature person's full and untrammelled exercise
of capacities central to human rationality.
The value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep relation to self-
respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life of
the spirit is meager and slavish.
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) (footnotes omitted). But see Bork, Neutral Principles
and some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (arguing that the self-fulfill-
ment rationale is inadequate because individuals derive satisfaction from a multitude of
other pleasurable activities that are indistinguishable from the functions or benefits of
speech).
149. The distinction between humor for its own sake and humor employed as social com-
mentary is important. Although the job of dividing a statement into elements of pure humor
and pure commentary is difficult, it is conceptually possible. For example, the parody at
issue in Hustler Magazine ridiculed Jerry Falwell by attributing to him some unlikely char-
acteristics-that he was an alcoholic and sexually immoral. The effect was to offend some
and amuse others. The parody clearly communicated the message that Larry Flynt thought
Falwell was a hypocrite. For that reason, it made some contribution to public debate, and
courts should protect it under the "search for truth" rationale. Compare this to the facts of
Raye v. Letterman, 14 Media L. Rptr. 2047 (BNA) (1987), in which David Letterman in a
broadcast of his Late Night television program, told his audience, "I saw the most terrifying
commercial on television last night, featuring Martha Raye, actress, condom user." Martha
Raye is perhaps best known for her commercials in which she is introduced as "Martha
Raye, actress, denture wearer." The social commentary contained in this joke, if any exists,
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By drawing the line between protected and nonprotected speech
at a point along the continuum, and not by strict classifications of
fact or opinion, a court can avoid the unnecessary and unfortunate
result of protecting all nonfactual expression from liability for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. Under current standards,
courts in cases involving humorous material are protecting abso-
lutely nonfactual speech that is literally false, that the jury has
found "outrageous," and that offers no objectively discernible
opinion. Courts must recognize that not all nonfactual speech is of
equal value.
The Distinction Between Opinion and Fantasy
Despite its potential advantages, the attempt to split nonfactual
speech into separate, readily identifiable groups presents enormous
difficulties. First, although pure humor is conceptually distinguish-
able from pure opinion, real-world communication rarely operates
quite so neatly. The Hustler Magazine case presents a typical ex-
ample. By publishing the parody in his magazine, Larry Flynt ac-
complished two things. He probably made a few readers laugh, and
he probably caused a few to reflect, however briefly, on their im-
pressions of Jerry Falwell and Falwell's standing in society. One
could argue that similar accomplishments exist for the facts of
Pring and Polygram. An obvious explanation for these dual effects
is that readers of the Hustler parody laugh because Falwell is the
target of the attack; as a result, the parody communicates some
objectively discernible opinion about Falwell's character. Humor-
ists can, however, easily entertain their audiences without convey-
ing any intelligible "opinion" in the course of their remarks. 150 In
perhaps has something to do with the amount of sexual activity expected of older women.
The difference between the two cases is one of degree. The Hustler parody is perhaps mean-
spirited, but it does comment on the status of a figure of political importance. The Letter-
man joke is more of a bizarre juxtaposition than a social comment. See P. GRAWE, supra
note 120, at 15 (distinguishing "'frothy' comedy with little to recommend it beyond the
light, inconsequential entertainment it offers" and "serious comedy, which engages the intel-
ligence and artistic discrimination of the most sensitive audiences as well as the talents of
the greatest geniuses of theatre in almost every age").
150. As Paul Grawe says, "[T]he same genre can contain within itself not only extremely
light, entertaining, 'frothy' stuff but also intensely serious works with ultimate religious sig-
nificance." P. GRAWE, supra note 118, at 12. The difference, in broad terms, is between The
Three Stooges and a Noel Coward play. The argument that, over time, the humor of The
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the instance when a humorist expresses no opinion and an individ-
ual incurs harm because of the publication, to permit recovery
seems fitting. Courts could restrict recovery to cases in which the
injurious publication's sole purpose was entertainment; that is, af-
ter applying an objective test, the finder of fact could ascertain no
meaningful opinion that the speaker communicated.
Two responses to this argument are immediately apparent. First,
freedom of expression encompasses humor, and the value of a joke
is something worthy of protection.15' Although this has some ap-
peal, a stronger argument for denying recovery even in those situa-
tions in which the plaintiff has suffered a cognizable harm because
of a speaker's humorous remarks is that, speaking practically, pure
opinion cannot be separated easily from pure fantasy. Just as
someone can always find a bit of redeeming social value in a porno-
graphic film, one can find "opinion" or serious social comment in
most jokes if one looks hard enough. A second response is that the
first amendment requires some "breathing space" in order to func-
tion fully and effectively.'52 Attempts to impose liability on come-
dians for the jokes they tell may chill desirable social commentary.
Three Stooges conveys some meaning of deep philosophical significance is conceptually un-
satisfactory. Assuming a plaintiff has suffered emotional or reputational harm as a result of
the defendant's remarks, the relevant scope of the inquiry should be restricted to an exami-
nation of the injurious publication.
151. This is the argument of those endorsing the self-fulfillment rationale for free expres-
sion. See supra note 150. The equities of isolated cases, however, do not support protecting
the speech. Assume a plaintiff suffers severe emotional or reputational harm as a result of
defendant's purely humorous speech. Permitting the plaintiff to go uncompensated because
the defendant desires to tell a funny story is grossly unfair.
A better reason to deny compensation to the target of the joke is that once liability is
imposed and judgments are awarded valuable expression may be chilled to some degree. See
generally L. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT, THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION OF
PRIVACY AcTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987). A solution to the chilling effect problem
is to reform tort law. Several recent proposals have been made in this regard. See Anderson,
Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984); Smolla &
Gaertner, supra note 43; Wissler, Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 43.
152. Justice Brennan introduced the notion of "breathing space" for the first amendment
in his opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964). The concept was
an important part of Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988), as he wrote, "'Freedoms of expression require breathing space.' This
breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for
libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the
statement was made with the requisite level of culpability." Id. at 52 (quoting Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)) (citations omitted). The troubling as-
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Furthermore, because of their status, public figures enjoy certain
protections that tend to counteract or mitigate any damage caused
by humorous speech. For example, an individual encountering the
Falwell parody will probably conclude, after a moment's delibera-
tion, that the parody does not alter meaningfully the reader's per-
ception of Falwell for several reasons. First, Falwell has been a
public figure for some time, and most people have formed an opin-
ion of him as a result of his participation in public life. 153 Second,
the context of the publication instructs the reader not to take it
seriously. For example, the parody was labeled "ad parody-not to
be taken seriously.' 1 54 Third, the content of the parody diverges
significantly from commonly held perceptions of Falwell. Finally,
Falwell can effectively combat the Hustler parody because of his
special access to media channels. On balance, when courts apply
the law to public figure plaintiffs, the strong public interest in ro-
bust debate justifies the rule requiring the public figure to prove a
false statement of fact regardless of the type of injury alleged.
Special Problems for Private Figure Plaintiffs
Private figure plaintiffs do not have access to this same sort of
protection. By definition, private figures do not have commonly
perceived reputations. Neither do they have ready access to the
media to contest the attacks of others. Nevertheless, a logical co-
rollary emanating from the Court's opinion in Hustler Magazine
would limit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising in a media-related context to those private figure plaintiffs
who can show that the defendant negligently made a false state-
ment of fact. This corollary merely separates the protection the
Court has already provided for media defendants in earlier defa-
mation cases and applies it in the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress setting. Under this view, a private figure attacked in
a manner similar to the parody in Hustler Magazine would not be
able to recover for emotional distress once the jury decided that
the defendent made no statement of fact. For the reasons dis-
pect of the breathing space logic is that it implies that protection for expression pushes past
its territorial boundaries and extends to speech that may not require such protection.
153. See supra note 73.
154. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
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cussed above, however, the jury would have been less likely to ar-
rive at that conclusion if the plaintiff in Hustler Magazine had
been a private figure.155
Therefore, in cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress
brought by private figures, the logic of Hustler Magazine inade-
quately protects the plaintiff's interest in being free of outra-
geously inflicted forms of emotional and physical harm. In order to
compensate private figure plaintiffs in these actions, courts must
undertake the dangerous business of classifying expression as ei-
ther opinion or nonsense. Such a decision is perhaps not as daunt-
ing as it may initially appear. Juries are, as a matter of course,
regularly called upon to make difficult decisions. In actions for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, for example, the jury
must make the wholly unquantifiable judgment as to whether par-
ticular behavior is "outrageous." Properly instructed as to what
constitutes an opinion, a jury is equally capable of sorting out ex-
pression that communicates an idea from one that communicates
only hatred, cruelty, or humiliation.
CONCLUSION
Beginning with its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,15 and continuing through Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,'57 the
Supreme Court has crafted elaborate protections for citizens who
exercise their first amendment right of free expression. Pure opin-
ions are completely protected, and speakers may even make false
statements of fact as long as those statements are not made with
the requisite fault. Because of this bent toward protecting expres-
sion, judicial protection of humor may have disturbed the balance
between free expression and an individual's interest in freedom
from personal attacks that damage his reputation or intentionally
inflict severe emotional distress. Under the current analysis, a
speaker may attack another without fear of judicial sanction if the
speaker strategically employs the vehicle of humor. By failing to
distinguish between speech that is simply "fantasy" or "nonsense"
from expressions of opinion, the Court has carved out first amend-
155. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
156. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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ment protection for speech that is factually false, outlandish, by
definition not opinion in the sense that it is not useful as social
commentary, and that causes a harm that is traditionally compen-
sable. Because a private figure plaintiff has a greater interest in
being free from the kind of psychological and reputational harm
that such fantastic speech can inflict, the practical difficulties in
separating opinion from fantasy must be overcome to permit
recovery.
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